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Information in an Antitrust Age
Salil Kumar Mehrat

It has become well-accepted that some information age
industries possess distinctive characteristics that may constitute
reasons either to invoke antitrust law or to refrain from doing so.1
One of these characteristics is the presence of "network effects"2simply put, the idea that "consumers place greater value on large
networks than small ones."3 While network effects have featured
prominently in the discussion concerning these industries, the
general principle that previous antitrust experience may not be
relevant to these new contexts applies more broadly.4 Specifically,
established antitrust presumptions may not serve courts and
regulators well in addressing the use or sale of information, as
opposed to more traditional product markets.'

t J.D. 1995, University of Chicago; M.A. 1992, University of California at Berkeley;
A.B. 1991 Harvard University. Assistant Professor of Law, James F. Beasley School of
Law, Temple University. Article written while an Associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz. The views and opinions set forth herein are solely those of the author. I would like
to thank my wife, Sarah B. Mehra, for her assistance with and support during the writing
of this piece. Nevertheless, all errors and omissions are mine.
1 See Mark Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 479, 500-23 (1998) (discussing a number of recent antitrust cases
involving network effects). Compare George Priest, Antitrust Enforcement in the Information Age, 4 Tex Rev L & Polit 141, 143 (arguing that the "network effect' of [Microsoft]
Windows ... is an efficiency, not a barrier") with Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network
Industries, 7 Geo Mason U L Rev 673, 674 (1999) (arguing that network effects exacerbate
the possibility that an incumbent monopolist can use exclusive contracts with customers
to prevent new entry).
2 The term "network effects" is generally applied to describe markets characterized
by increasing returns to scale. See, for example, Lemley and McGowan, 86 Cal L Rev at
611 n 5 (1998) (cited in note 1) (distinguishing "network effects" from "network externalities").
3 Id. Note that commentators often distinguish between "strong" and "weak" forms of
network effects. Id at 500-04, 590-99 (cited in note 1) (giving the internet as an example
of the former and contract law as an example of the latter).
4 See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis in High Tech Industries, 4 Tex Rev L &
Polit 129, 130 (1999) (arguing that with respect to the question of "whether antitrust
principles, developed primarily in the context of smokestack industries, should apply
comparably ... to new problems ... it is essential to acknowledge that high-tech industries are different and [antitrust] enforcement must take those differences into account").
5 Compare Priest, 4 Tex Rev L & Polit at 141 (cited in note 1) (advocating
'adapt[ation ofl our interpretation of the antitrust laws to novel industrial situations and
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The Supreme Court began the 1990s in antitrust with
Eastman Kodak, Co v Image Technical Services, Inc,6 a case that
seemed to indicate that information costs were a concern that
antitrust courts should consider,7 and ended the 1990s with
CaliforniaDental Association v FTC ("CDA"),5 which focused on
how such courts should treat arrangements affecting the
dissemination of price information Notably, the Court in CDA
concluded that an agreement affecting how member dentists
could convey information to their prospective patients by
advertising price discounts or service quality should not be
governed by the presumptions of "quick look" review, particularly
rejecting the idea that non-price restrictions on the dissemination
of such information amounted to "output restrictions."' ° Given the
Court's concern in Kodak that consumers' relative inability to
gather accurate pre-purchase information about product quality
could yield exploitable market power for producers,11 the question
of how courts should treat product information appears ripe for
examination. Indeed, in the emerging context of the internet,
where the product is often information itself, the distance from
the experiential basis of conventional antitrust presumptions
increases.12
While the relationship between information and antitrust
law is certainly beyond the scope of any single article, this piece
examines the implications of CDA and Kodak for the relationship
between antitrust law and three types of information: (a)
information about price; (b) information about product quality;
and (c) information that is the product itself. Producers' creation
of and consumers' access to information are in a state of rapid
flux. " As a result, courts should hesitate to apply the per se rules
and structured rules of reason because of the dubious
to modern industries that operate much differently from the industries that our antitrust
laws have regulated in the past").
6 504 US 451 (1992).
7 See id at 473-76.
8 526 US 756 (1999).
9 For a general discussion, see id.
10 Id at 779-80.
11 504 US at 473.
12 Compare Priest, 4 Tex Rev L & Polit at 141-43 (cited in note 1) (contrasting the
source of market power in information technology with the source of market power in
manufacturing industries; comparing the economic efficiency of an operating system to the
efficiency of a language; comparing internet browsers to components of a language).
13 See Nicholas Khadder, National Basketball Association v Motorola, Inc, 13 Berkeley Tech L J 3, 3 (1998) (N[T]he Internet has enabled users to distribute and sell information very widely at a negligible marginal cost to the distributor.").
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applicability of presumptions developed in different, earlier
contexts. Eventually, similar presumptions should be developed
for the traditional reasons that they encourage judicial efficiency
and create certainty for businesspeople. But given the new
realities of how internet markets work, and the potential
obsolescence of some established antitrust presumptions, it is too
soon yet.
I. PRICE INFORMATION
The idea that antitrust law should be concerned with the
availability of information about prices seems unremarkable. After all, a market economy depends on the price mechanism
working properly-and indeed, the price of a given good or service
has been described as a mechanism whereby the free market conveys information about supply and demand that is dispersed
among many consumers and producers that otherwise cannot be
accurately coordinated." Accordingly, because consumers must
know about prices to act upon them, consumers' ability to get information concerning the prices of goods and services is crucial to
economic efficiency.15
Despite this fact, the Supreme Court in CDA rejected the
proposition that all agreements restricting the dissemination of
price information may be "dismiss [ed] as presumptively wrong."16
In doing so, the Court acknowledged the possibility of a meaningful distinction between more information on the one hand, and
better quality information on the other, suggesting that the two
objectives may not be furthered by the same rule or practice. 7
The idea that more information may not be better informationfamiliar to scholars in areas such as administrative law'--suggests that, in considering how agreements that restrict information about prices affect competition, the standard presumptions
14

For a general discussion, see Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago

1960).
15 See notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
16

CDA v FTC, 526 US at 775.

17 See id (noting that the rule in question "appear[ed] to reflect the prediction that

any costs to competition associated with the elimination of across-the-board [discount]
advertising will be outweighed by gains to consumer information (and hence competition)
created by [itemized] discount advertising that is exact, accurate, and more easily verifiable").
18 See Richard Pildes and Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U Chi
L Rev 1, 108 (1995) (stating that "[e]ffective information disclosure requires knowledge of
the beliefs on which citizens are likely to draw" and "[miore information might even make
people less informed").
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that apply to antitrust examination of restrictions on output or on
prices may not hold. Rather, a more plenary investigation may be
warranted.
In CDA, the Court rejected the quick look approach to reviewing restrictions on member dentists' use of broad discount
claims in their advertising. 9 The Court noted that the restraints
involved were "at least on their face, designed to avoid false or
deceptive advertising in a market characterized by striking disparities between the information available to the professional and
the patient"" and concluded that such a restriction on information should ultimately be reviewed under a full rule-of-reason
analysis. 2' The fact that the Federal Trade Commission had
originally treated the California Dental Association's restrictions
on discount advertising as a price restraint that was illegal per se
makes the CDA decision all the more radical. 2
The Court's rejection of a quick look or structured rule of reason approach was based on disagreement with the premise that a
bar on "advertisement of across-the-board discounts" would necessarily "have a net anticompetitive effect."" In particular, the
Court posited that "[i]n a suspicious world, the discipline of specific example may well be a necessary condition of plausibility"
for "claims that for all practical purposes defy comparison shopping".2 4 As a result, the California Dental Association's rule would
"appear[ I to reflect the prediction that any costs to competition
associated with the elimination of across-the-board advertising
will be outweighed by gains to consumer information (and hence
competition) created by discount advertising that is exact, accu19 526 US at 765.
20 Id at 771. The Court noted that "[the fact that a restraint operates upon a profes-

sion as distinguished from a business is ... relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act." Id at 771 n 10. However, lest one conclude
that the informational asymmetry the Court was considering only appears in markets for
professional services, it should be noted that the Court also cited a classic study of market
failure due to asymmetrical information in the market for used cars. Id at 772, citing
George Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons. Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q J Econ 488 (1970).
21 526 US at 759.
22 CaliforniaDental Association v FTC, 128 F3d 720, 726 (9th Cir 1997) (noting that
"[tihe Commission [below] concluded that the CDA's restrictions on price advertisingnamely, the effective ban on volume discounts and statements describing prices as 'low' or
'reasonable'-were per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the FTC Act"),
vacated in 526 US 756. Alternatively, the Commission also held these restrictions to be
violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts under an abbreviated rule-of-reason or "quick
look" standard. See 128 F3d at 725 n 4.
'3 526 US at 774.
24 Id.
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rate, and more easily verifiable."25 The Court noted that, although

such a view might be correct or incorrect, it was not implausible,
and therefore it was inappropriate to dismiss it as anticompetitive based on a per se or structured rule-of-reason analysis.26
The Court's decision concerning price advertising implies
that antitrust courts and regulators should be wary of attempts
to apply per se rules or structured rules of reason beyond the context of the experiences in which such presumptions developed,
particularly where agreements concern information. When courts
confront new or different phenomena than the observed phenomena that led courts to develop such presumptions, the rationales
behind the presumptions do not apply. The experience that justified the presumption may not be relevant.
This logic accords with the justifications found in the case
law for such presumptions. The Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde27 stated that the goal of presumptions that underlie per se rules is "to avoid a burdensome
inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the
likelihood of competitive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the cost of determining whether the particular case at bar
involves anticompetitive conduct."" Similarly, in Continental TV,
Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc ,29 the Court recognized that strict application of the per se rule will sometimes result in incorrect rulings,
while the administrative benefits of the per se rule outweigh the
costs of such incorrect determinations." In plainer terms, per se
rules and structured rules of reason ultimately stem from a
judgment that certain restraints, practices, and other phenomena
are highly correlated with anticompetitive effects. The correlation
is so high, in fact, that an irrebuttable presumption against such
phenomena, in the case of per se rules, leads to so great an increase in efficiency of enforcement and adjudication that it outweighs the potential for mistakes and the cost of chilling procompetitive agreements that would benefit society. 1 Ultimately, the

25
26
27
28

Id at 775.
Id.
466 US 2 (1984).
Id at 15-16 n 25.

29 433 US 36 (1976).
30 Id at 50 n 16.

31 See Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 15 (Aug 1984)
(agreeing with administrative benefit versus cost of overenforcement rubric, but stating
that "errors on the side of excusing questionable practices are preferable"). But see Oliver
Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 Geo L J 271, 289 (Dec 1987) (questioning view that,
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irrebutable presumptions that underlie per se rules and the rebuttable presumptions, or burden shifting steps, that underlie
intermediate forms of review such as structured rules of reason,
would be unnecessary in a world without enforcement and adjudication costs. 2 However, in the real world, courts optimize by
generating such rules, which are selected from experience to reduce enforcement and adjudication costs.
In CDA, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
per se rule against price restraints should be extended to restraints on information about price discounts, at least in the context of dentist advertising.3 3 This makes sense, because the per se
rule against restraints on product price information implicates
somewhat different concerns than restraints on price information
about a good, such as a professional service, whose exact price
may not be known in advance, or the price of an experience good,
a product about whose characteristics a consumer may be uncertain prior to purchasing it. As the Court noted explicitly, it could
not confirm from experience that the restraint at issue was inherently anticompetitive. 4 It was at least plausible that by restricting claims of price discounts or quality that patients could
not verify, the CDA member dentists (not all California dentists
were CDA members3 5 ) were actually creating value for their patients. Though the court did not consider the point, it might be
objected that, even if the CDA had allowed unverifiable advertising, patients might be no worse off, since they would tend not
to believe unverifiable claims, much as they might discount puffery. s But this hypothesis oversimplifies the potential information
in weighing incentives behind antitrust legal rules, "the costs of monopoly wrongly permitted are small, while the costs of competition wrongly condemned are large").
32 Real-world legal rules ideally should be designed to minimize the sum of the cost of
making errors and the litigation costs of the parties and the courts. See Richard Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand Judicial Administration, 2 J Legal Stud
99, 399-400 (1973) ("[LIegal procedure is conceived to be the minimization of the sum of
two types of costs: 'error costs' (the social costs generated when a judicial system fails to
carry out the allocative or other social functions assigned to it), and the 'direct costs' (such
as lawyers', judges' and litigants' time)."); see also Timothy Muris, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Rule of Reason, 66 Antitrust L J 773, 774-76 (1998). Accordingly,
without litigation costs, it would be suboptimal to create presumptions that lead to false
negatives and false positives.
33 526 US at 759.
34

Id at 781.

Id at 759 (stating that the CDA's membership comprises "about three-quarters of
th[e dentists] practicing" in California).
36 See, for example, Maio v Aetna, Inc, 1999 WL 800315 (E D Pa) (rejecting allegations of fraud since defendant health plans' "statements concerning th[eir] commitment to
quality health care are 'mere puffery"').
35
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asymmetry at work in the professional service context. One might
imagine an additional level of complexity: patients may not even
know which claims are verifiable and which are not. Or imagine
there is even a further level of patient ignorance: they may not
even realize, with respect to certain claims, that any issue of verifiability exists.
With additional layers of patient ignorance, individual dentists may face an incentive to make unverifiable claims, since patients' ignorance may give dentists an edge over other their competitors who refuse to make such claims. If many dentists did so,
the result could be an overall erosion of trust in dentists. Further,
the dentists may be worse off than if they-as CDA member dentists-had tried to foster an overall reputation for honesty and
integrity through restraints on unverifiable advertising. This is
especially true if, as is likely, dentists themselves are not hampered by the same ignorance as their patients in enforcing the
CDA rules. 7
Of course, this scenario was not part of the record in CDA,
and it may not even be an accurate description of reality. But it
may have been the concern to which the Court alluded in describing the plausible procompetitive nature of the restraints at
issue. At any rate, the lack of judicial experience with the point at
issue-compared with the wealth of experience regarding competitor agreements to restrict prices or output 3 -- counsels against
using traditional tools of antitrust analysis like evidentiary presumptions antagonistic to the defendant.
II. INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY
In making purchase decisions, consumers do not only consider information about price, but also consider information about
product quality. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court has twice considered-in the two different contexts of CDA and Kodak-the
difficulty consumers have in obtaining quality-related information and the implications for antitrust enforcement.39
Of course, in classical economic analysis, which assumes perfect information, a court need not analyze product quality sepa37 It should not be overlooked that CDA membership was apparently not a prerequisite to practicing dentistry. CDA, 526 US at 759.
38 See National Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of University of

Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 100-101 (1984) (stating that there is significant 'judicial experience" in determining whether to apply a per se rule).
39 See CaliforniaDentalAssociation v FTC, 526 US 756, 772 (1999); Kodak, 504 US at
472.
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rately from price, because under that assumption, consumers discount the price they are willing to pay accordingly for inferior
quality.4" However, in the real world, consumers make choices in
markets every day without the benefit of perfect information.4 1
The two instances in which the Court considered the implications
for antitrust in CDA and Kodak both involved information
asymmetries. In CDA, the Court concluded that an agreement
that restricted the dissemination of information about product
quality could not be presumed to be anticompetitive.4 2 Although
the Court in Kodak concluded that consumers' difficulty in obtaining information about product quality could yield market
power in aftermarkets that opportunistic sellers could exploit,43
the degree of that danger-assuming that such a danger existed-has been greatly lessened by the development of more and
cheaper product information due to technological advances such
as the internet.44
A. The Problem of Product Quality Information Gaps
To address the implications for antitrust of CDA, Kodak, and
the development of more, cheaper information, an understanding
of information gaps is helpful. The possible effect of cheaper,
more accessible information can be illustrated by two examples of
how information costs relate to the concept of aftermarket monopolies as considered in Kodak.4" First, consider a consumer who
must buy both original equipment and aftermarket products. Under the assumptions of classical economics, the consumer possesses perfect (that is, costless and complete) information about
40

J.A.K. Huntley, Unfair Competition, Consumer Deception, and Brand Copying, 15

Intl Rev L and Econ 443, 15 (1995) (explaining how imperfect information inhibits the
ability of consumers to make price/quality tradeoffs).
41 See, for example, B. Furrow, et al, Health Law 57 (West 1995) (stating that "the lay
public is incapable of adequately evaluating the quality of medical services"); Akerlof, 84 Q
J Econ at 490-92 (cited in note 20) (discussing the possibility that asymmetrical information can lead to inefficient market outcomes).
42 526 US at 771-73.
43 504 US at 475.
44 See Part III.
45 For simplicity, both examples are grounded in the assumptions of perfect competition. However, the first model has perfect information about price, quality, and sources of
supply, while the second does not. Perfect information is one of the three conditions of a
perfectly competitive market in classical economics. The other two conditions are that (1)
buyers and sellers must be numerous, and consequently price takers in the sense that
their individual transactions do not affect the market price, and (2) the product sold by the
firms in the industry must be homogeneous. Edwin Mansfield, Principlesof Microeconomics 219-20 (Norton 3d ed 1980).

2191

INFORMATION IN ANANTITRUSTAGE

price and other attributes of all goods in the market.46 Thus, consumers can estimate the costs of original equipment and aftermarket needs together as if they were a single product. If an
original equipment manufacturer ("OEM") tried to sell this aggregate product at higher than the equilibrium price in the market, the informed consumer would purchase elsewhere.47 As a result, Kodak-style aftermarket monopolies cannot exist in the
classical economic world of perfect competition.48
By contrast, in a world of imperfect information, an OEM
could theoretically make a consumer pay prices that are higher
than the market price would be in a world of perfect
competition." For example, suppose that the consumer is at the
OEM's store, and that the consumer possesses some knowledge
about the OEM's products," but no knowledge, good or bad, about
those of the OEM's competitor. Suppose that it costs the consumer time and effort to learn more about what is available at
competitors' stores and about competitors' products. We can sum
46

Id.

47 Suppose the competitive market price for original equipment is P and the competi-

tive market price for aftermarket goods and services is p. Suppose also that the OEM in
question overcharges for original equipment and aftermarket goods and services by margins M and m respectively above the competitive price. Because this is a perfect competition model, there are no information costs. Thus, consumers will buy elsewhere when:
cost of buying from the OEM > cost of buying elsewhere
P+M+p+m>P+p
Subtracting (P + p) from each side,
M + m > 0.
Thus, whenever the OEM in question charges any total margin on original equipment and
aftermarket goods greater than zero, consumers will purchase elsewhere.
Granted, those consumers who have already purchased may be stuck with the OEM
if the OEM is the only maker of aftermarket goods for its product. This could result if
OEMs possess intellectual property protection for the design of aftermarket products such
as replacement parts. See John J. Voortman, Curbing Aftermarket Monopolization, 38
Antitrust Bull 221, 222-23 (1993). But with perfect information, new consumers will factor such an OEM's overpricing into their assessment of the OEM's original equipment.
48 For a more detailed description of which departures from perfect competition must
exist in order for OEMs to benefit from higher aftermarket prices, see Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, 311-13 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1992).
49 Note that under the assumptions of perfect competition (which include perfect
information) the price a producer charges and the producer's marginal cost are equal. See
Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy §3.1a at 79-80 (West 1994) (illustrating
that a producer's real-world market power may thus be gauged in a philosophical sense by
reference to the degree to which the marginal cost of a product differs from a product's
price).
50 Product-specific knowledge is an important cause of switching costs. See Joseph
Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 Antitrust L J 1, 11-13
(1993). Consider the difficulty a Macintosh user often has making the transition to using
DOS.
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up these various costs in time and effort and call them "information costs."51 Because of these information costs, the OEM could
charge a higher-than-market price for the combination of the
original equipment and aftermarket goods or services, so long as
the margin between the market price and the price the OEM
charges is less than the amount of the information costs. In that
event, the consumer will find it less costly to pay supracompetitive prices than to incur the information costs necessary to avoid
such prices.
Though simplistic, this example illustrates the effect that information costs can have. As a result of information costs, an
OEM can set prices above the competitive level, and consumers
will find it preferable to pay those prices. The higher the information costs, the greater the ability to price above the market. This
is important because the touchstone of any antitrust claim
against a monopolistic firm's "market power" has been defined as
the "power [of a seller] to set higher than competitive prices.""
In addition to the restraints on advertising across-the-board
price discounts, in CDA, the Court also considered the validity of
an agreement that restricted "[a]dvertising claims as to the quality

of

services

... not

susceptible

to

measurement

or

51 "Information costs" would also include the costs a buyer would incur in estimating
future aftermarket needs and the market prices of those aftermarket needs for different
brands of a product. See Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets:
The Consumer ProtectionIssues, 62 BU L Rev 661, 690-91 (1982).
52 Suppose that the competitive price is P for the original equipment and p for the
aftermarket goods and services, and information costs that must be incurred to purchase
elsewhere are i. Suppose the margins by which the OEM in question charges above the
competitive price are M and m respectively for the original equipment and the aftermarket goods and services. The consumer will purchase from the OEM in question when:
cost of buying from the OEM < cost of buying elsewhere
P+M+p+m<P+p+i
Subtracting (P + p) from each side,
M + m <i.
Thus, when the total margin by which the OEM in question overcharges is less than the
information costs that must be incurred to purchase elsewhere, the consumer will buy
from the OEM in question. This method of approaching the problem proceeds from the
idea that one party bases its optimization decision on the assumption that the other party
will also choose the alternative that maximizes its own gain. For a general discussion, see
Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law
50-57 (Harvard 1994) (using a game theory approach to determine parties' optimal decision trees). The greater the information costs, the greater the ability to impose supracompetitive pricing. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust
Policy and the Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L Rev 1447, 1447-49 (1993) (arguing that in product
differentiated markets, firms may possess the ability to price above the competitive level
indefinitely) ("[Tihe policy question becomes one of degree: how many and what kinds of
deviations should be tolerated."). Id at 1448-49.
53 MatsushitaElectric IndustrialCo v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 590 (1986).
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verification."54 The Federal Trade Commission had concluded that
this agreement was sufficiently anticompetitive that it did not
require a full-blown rule-of-reason inquiry to condemn; rather,
the Commission concluded it could apply a "quick look" analysis."
Under such a quick look analysis, the agreement would be presumed to be anticompetitive and the defendants would be required to show otherwise. 6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this conclusion on the ground that restrictions on quality claims "are in
effect a form of output limitation, as they restrict the supply of
information about individual dentists' services.""
The Supreme Court rejected the idea that restrictions on
quality claims are a form of output restriction.58 Noting that "the
relevant output for antitrust purposes ... is presumably not information or advertising, but dental services themselves," the
Court focused on whether the agreement "tend[ed] to limit the
total delivery of dental services."" In that vein, the Court acknowledged that it was "entirely possible to understand the
CDA's restrictions on unverifiable quality ... advertising as
60
nothing more than a procompetitive ban on puffery."

CDA held that a restriction on claims of product quality could
not be considered presumptively anticompetitive." Accordingly, a
full rule-of-reason inquiry was warranted.2 Although this idea
was contrary to the conclusion of the Federal Trade Commission
and the Ninth Circuit, it is hardly extraordinary given that a restraint on making quality claims is not economically equivalent
to a restraint on making quality products or providing quality
service.
A comparison with trademark law, another area implicating
concerns about product information and competition, illustrates
the reasoning behind CDA. Trademark protection enables a seller
to build brand loyalty, which confers a degree of market power.6"
54 526 US at 761 n 1.
55 128 F3d at 726.
56

526 US at 775 n 12.

51 128 F3d at 729 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit did not explain why, if the
court believed restrictions on quality claims did amount to output restrictions, they should
not be condemned per se as with other output restrictions.
58 526 US at 776-77.
59 Id at 776.
60
61

Id at 778.
Id at 775.

526 US at 780-81.
At least one commentator has suggested that "many popular brands do possess
sufficient brand loyalty to constitute distinct product markets." Glynn Lunney, Jr.,
62

63
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In other words, a consumer may exhibit a high degree of resistance to purchasing a lower-priced, potential substitute product
that does not possess the trademark of the desired brand.64
Despite this apparent harm to price competition, sellers nevertheless receive legal protection of their trademarks. 5 Traditionally, trademark protection has been justified on the basis of a
mark's function in conveying information. 6 In particular, the
consumer can use the mark as a proxy for the characteristics that
would otherwise not be readily observable-for example, one relies, without opening the can, on the belief that the contents of a
can of Coca-Cola will taste like Coca-Cola.67 A mark can also
serve this function with respect to conveying the overall quality of
a good whose efficacy one cannot be reasonably sure of without
expert knowledge-such as the "American Dental Association
Accepted" mark on certain brands of toothpaste.
Trademark protection exemplifies the balance between overall
welfare and reduced consumer willingness to switch products
based on price. This balance may also have been at work in the
California Dental Association's restrictions. Consumers were denied the opportunity to learn about various dentists' claims about
their services, at least to the extent that such claims were "unverifiable."" But potentially, by limiting puffery, these restrictions may have amplified whatever sources of verifiable quality
information existed, including consumers' own experience.
In CDA, the Court took a more benign look than did the FTC
at an agreement that, on its face, limited how dentists could convey information in order to improve the quality of the information
their patients received. 9 The Court's treatment of a restriction on
Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L J 367, 426-27 (1999). "Trademark law seeks to rid
the market of the 'free rider' who attempts to benefit from the reputation of a competitor
by deceiving consumers about the source and quality" of the free rider's product-thus
appropriating the competitor's "consumer loyalty." Diane Reed, Use of Like/Love Slogans
in Trademark Advertising, 26 San Diego L Rev 101, 102 (1989).
64 See 504 US at 456-78, 482 n 31 (finding sufficient evidence that Kodak-brand copiers constituted distinct product market and citing other cases that concluded that a single
brand could constitute a distinct product market).
65 See Lunney, 48 Emory L J at 421 (cited in note 63) (describing Department of Justice "oppos[ition] [to] key provisions of the trademark bill on the grounds that they would
limit competition and promote undesirable monopoly").
66 See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising
Age, 108 Yale L J 1717, 1719-20 (1999) (describing and arguing for resurrection of traditional notion of trademarks based on "the public's interest inher[entl in the ability of trade
symbols to inform and prevent confusion").
67 See Lunney, 48 Emory L J at 432 (cited in note 63).
68 526 US at 757.
69 Id at 762, 771.

2191

INFORMATION INANANTITRUSTAGE

information concerning product quality appears to exist in some
tension with its previous endorsement of the view that consumers' inability to get information about product quality may itself
create exploitable market power for a manufacturing company."
However, that view itself may be ripe for reexamination.
The application of per se rules or structured rules of reason to
restrictions on information presents an especially thorny problem
because of the different and changing context within which restrictions on information operate. To illustrate the implications of
such changes for access to information about product quality,
consider one of the most cited Supreme Court cases of the decade:
Eastman Kodak, Co v Image Technical Services, Inc.7"
In Kodak, defendant Eastman Kodak faced competition in the
primary market for photocopiers:7 2 enough companies manufactured copiers that no one company could charge supracompetitive
prices and still maintain its market share.7" Relying on existing
case law, Kodak argued that it could not charge monopolistic
prices in the aftermarket for parts and supplies, because consumers would factor the higher aftermarket prices over the life of the
photocopier into their purchasing decision.74 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and denied Kodak summary judgment. 5
The Court concluded that "[tihe fact that the equipment market
imposes a restraint on prices in the aftermarkets by no means
disproves the existence of [market] power in those [after]markets."7 6 The Court noted that lack of information could
prevent consumers from factoring in possible future higher aftermarket prices into their original purchasing decisions.77 Purchasers who did not anticipate high-priced service and parts
would have to pay such prices because their sizable initial in70 See Thomas Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition:Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 NYU L Rev 1, 74 (1994) (arguing that the Court should revise its
apparent recognition in Kodak of treating "supracompetitive prices" attributable to "information gaps" as redressable by antitrust).
71 504 US 451.
72 Id at 465 n 10.
73 See Herbert Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 3.3 at 93 (West 1994) (noting
that Kodak had a 20-23 percent market share in photocopiers, which is below what courts
usually require "to support market power claims of any sort, including tying claims"). See
also, for example, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 7 (1984)
(finding that defendant had a 30 percent market share); id at 31 (ruling that this market
share was insufficient for restraint to injure competition).
74 504 US at 465-66.
75 Id at 471.
76

Id.

77 Id at 475-76.
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vestment would prevent easy switching, thereby giving Kodak
market power. '"
Kodak also argued that market imperfections, though possible, did not in fact injure consumers in the market for photocopiers. 9 According to Kodak, many of its customers were "sophisticated purchasers" who could undertake comparative studies and
demand competitive life-cycle prices."0 Sophisticated consumers,
Kodak argued, would not buy original equipment at supracompetitive prices." Kodak also stressed that the behavior of sophisticated consumers would bring unduly high aftermarket costs to
the attention of unsophisticated consumers. 2
Although the Court accepted the idea that well-informed consumers did not need antitrust protection from information-driven
market imperfections, the Court concluded that Kodak might be
able to overcharge "unsophisticated" consumers, 3 thereby still
reaping monopoly profits.8 4 Alternatively, the Court suggested
that Kodak might forgo sales to sophisticated buyers to soak the
unsophisticated."

78 504 US at 476.

79 Id at 475.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 504 US at 475.
83 Id. Antitrust law attempts to protect unsophisticated consumers in other areas,
including the determination of which mergers to bar as anticompetitive. See Hovenkamp,
Federal Antitrust Policy § 12.5a at 479 (cited in note 73) ("Courts have often cited the
presence of powerful or sophisticated buyers or suppliers as militating against the likelihood of any exercise of market power by a merging firm."). See also FTC v Elders Grain,
Inc, 868 F2d 901, 905 (7th Cir 1989) ("A concentrated and knowledgeable buying side
makes collusion by sellers more difficult.").
84 504 US at 475-76. Price discrimination occurs when a firm makes sales at more
than one rate of return. Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 14.1 at 516 (cited in note
73). If the favored purchaser is paying a competitive price, then the disfavored purchasers
must be paying a price higher than the competitive price. "For this reason, the ability to
price discriminate is evidence that the seller has a certain amount of market power." Id at
517.
85 504 US at 475. Note that the Court here seemed to have in mind a "pooling equilibrium" in which a party makes an offer in order to strategically separate groups who possess different levels of information. See Baird, Gertner, and Picker, Game Theory and the
Law at 140-47 (cited in note 52). Given certain conditions, one party can ask a question or
make an offer to another party that will force the second party to reveal information about
themselves that otherwise might remain private, nonverifiable information. Id at 147. In
the Kodak context, the Court posited that if there were two types of consumers, sophisticated and unsophisticated, Kodak might deliberately price its products so that sophisticated consumers would not consider them, in order to deal only with unsophisticated consumers. 504 US at 475-76.

2191

INFORMATION IN ANANTITRUSTAGE

233

In effect, the Supreme Court's ruling opened up a new line of
argument in the litigation of OEM aftermarket monopolies.8 6 The
Court pointed out that an OEM in a competitive primary market
could still possess market power in the aftermarket, so long as
certain information-driven market imperfections were prominent
enough. 7 However, shortly after the Court's decision was issued,
the internet started to change the ability of producers to convey
information and consumers to use it.
B. The Effect of the Internet on Product Quality
Information Gaps
Information gaps drove the Court's opinion in Kodak.
Whether due to the cost or unavailability of information, the
Court reasoned that consumers would be unable to estimate accurately the life-cycle costs of durable equipment. 8 However, the
new era of cheaper, more accessible information made possible by
the internet requires a re-evaluation of the risk that a firm could
use information costs to exercise or achieve market power.
The importance of information costs to the Kodak Court's
view of market power in aftermarkets suggests that the availability to consumers of higher quality information about a manufacturer's product could significantly ameliorate one of the
Court's major concerns. 9 The Kodak decision came out fairly re86 The Ninth Circuit's Kodak opinion was the first by a court of appeals to reject arguments such as Kodak's because of the possibility of market imperfections. See 504 US at
501 (Scalia dissenting) (citations omitted). "Dozens" of "aftermarket rights cases" were
filed in the first five years after the Supreme Court's opinion. See Daniel M. Wall, Aftermarket Monopoly Five Years After Kodak, 11-SUM Antitrust 32, 32 (1997).
87 504 US at 477-78.
88 Id at 473-74.
89 See Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 Antitrust
L J 1, 17 (1993) (stating that "[tihe quality of information available to consumers is a key
point in the Court's analysis of the Kodak case" and that "the Court believed that informational imperfections that facilitate the exercise of market power in markets for [aftermarket] goods is pervasive"). Note, however, that many commentators have suggested that the
market power involved here, however, could only be exploited by an OEM willing to engage in sales policy changes regarding aftermarket goods or services after an installed
base of customers had bought the OEM's durable equipment. See, for example, Digital
Equipment Corp v UNIQ Digital Techs, Inc, 73 F3d 756, 763 (7th Cir 1996) (finding that
the "material dispute that called for a trial [in Kodak] was whether the change in policy
enabled Kodak to extract supra-competitive prices from customers who had already purchased its machines"); Lee v Life Insurance Co of North America, 23 F3d 14, 20 (1st Cir
1994) (concluding that "thiad previous customers known, at the time they bought their
Kodak copiers, that Kodak would implement its restrictive parts-service policy, Kodak's
'market power', i.e., its leverage to induce customers to purchase Kodak servicing, could
only have been as significant as its [market power] in the copier market"). However, possible arguments against aftermarket monopolies-other than the "bait-and-switch" problem
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cently, in 1992. However, with respect to information availability,
1992 was another era. The internet makes information cheaper in
at least two ways. First, it reduces the transaction costs of manufacturers that desire to share information about product quality
with customers on a voluntary basis." Second, the internet makes
it easier for third parties to aggregate and distribute information
about consumer experience.9 1 Now, estimates of repair costs, including information about photocopiers, can be readily found online at www.repairnow.com or from Consumer Reports Online.9"
A dedicated information-gathering operation or months of research time is no longer necessary.
Of course, it might appear from the preceding example that
more accessible, cheaper information automatically obviates
problems relating to consumer information costs. However, as the
Court in CDA recognized, the verifiability of information is crucial. 3 Verification may be increasingly important in an era when
the product itself is information or access to information. Opportunities for strategic disclosure remain. For example, a recent
study conducted by a Wharton professor suggested that an individual online travel agent was setting up two different types of
web sites-one that was simple for consumers to use and that
charged higher prices, and one that was extremely difficult for
consumers to use and that charged relatively lower prices.94 In
another example, the study showed that some retailers use the
greater availability of information about their competitors' instock product from on-line sales sites-information meant for

illustrated above-would not necessarily be ameliorated by greater, cheaper access to
product quality information. See, for example, Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer
Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 Antitrust L J 483, 498-500 (1995) (considering theory
that price discrimination may be best pursued in aftermarkets, and doing so may lead a
monopolist to suppress aftermarket competition).
90 Indeed, manufacturers may have an incentive to share such information to attract
consumers, especially if concerns about product quality could diminish the market's efficiency due to competition with lower-quality-but hard to distinguish--competitors. See,
for example, Akerlof, 84 Q J Econ at 495 (cited in note 20). Of course, it is not enough that
manufacturers make quality claims-they must also make their claims credible. See also
Salil Kumar Mehra, Parts and Services Included: An Information-Centered Approach to
Kodak and the Problem of Aftermarket Monopolies, 62 U Chi L Rev 1521, 1523 (1995).
91 See, for example, R. Riley, Northworst Air, A resource about airline service and
passenger rights dedicated to Northwest Air (visited Apr 13, 2000) <http://www.
northworstair.org>; Untied (visited Apr 13, 2000) <http://www.untied.comi/> (collecting
grievances about United Air Lines). Admittedly, some of this is anecdotal data.
92 See <http://www.consumerreports.org> (visited Oct 24, 2000).
93 See text accompanying note 60.
94 Jacob Schlesinger, New E-conomy: If E-Commerce Helps Kill Inflation, Why Did
Prices Just Spike? Wall St J Al (Oct 18, 1999).
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consumers-to figure out when they can raise their prices on certain items without fear of being undercut. Though there is the
potential of a long-term procompetitive result, this tactic has resulted in higher prices due to less fear of competition.95 As these
examples suggest, information can be used to price discriminate
between consumers or to perfect strategic behavior vis-h-vis competitors. Moreover, information may actually make it harder to
verify what among the flood of information is in fact misinformation.96 A rapid expansion in available information may have unpredictable results, a possibility that calls into question the wisdom of applying rigid presumptions.
Given the recent increase in the availability of "life-cycle
pricing" information on the internet, perhaps it is time to reexamine the continuing importance of information gaps that drove
the Court's concerns about aftermarket monopolies in Kodak.
However, it may be too soon to conclude that such information
gaps have disappeared. Questions about the verifiability by consumers of information or claims about quality-an issue highlighted by CDA97-may still be cause for concern. In this context,
changed circumstances justify building a new body of experience
with such information gaps before applying preexisting presumptions.
III. INFORMATION AS PRODUCT

While it may be important to avoid a rush to apply established antitrust presumptions to information about a product's
price or quality, it may be even more important to avoid such undue haste with respect to industries where the product itself is
information. That is not to say that antitrust may not play a role
in such industries. Rather, industries that produce information or
facilitate access to information are undergoing a period of tremendous change, consolidation and reconfiguration, during which
oversimplified antitrust enforcement could present serious dangers.9" New presumptions should be developed in line with new

95 Id.
96 See text accompanying note 18.

97 See text accompanying note 60.
98 See Priest, 4 Tex Rev L & Polit at 143 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that the efficiency of the configuration of information into networks that benefit consumers is a factor
that distinguishes some new industries from the traditional manufacturing industries
more typical of antitrust enforcers' experience).
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experiences relative to concerns about anticompetitive conduct or
over-enforcement.
Certain characteristics distinguish an "information" product
or "information access" product from other products. For one
thing, the ownership of information does not generally imply an
easy way to exclude others from consuming the same producteven without paying a price for it. This is not the case with the
ownership of a physical product, such as an apple.9 9 Similarly,
software, once produced, can be so cheaply distributed that the
marginal cost of producing each consumer's "unit" of information
access can be negligible.' °
Furthermore, the internet can create new ways to profitably
gather and redisseminate information. By reducing the transaction costs of both gathering and disseminating information, the
internet can make possible entirely new businesses, such as online education, which produces information and access to information.'o
The internet has also generated opportunities for businesses
that aggregate and condense information from many sources that
otherwise would be much more difficult for ordinary consumers to
process.' 2 The fact is that consumers need information in forms
that they can digest.0 3
99 But see Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 131-12 (Basic 1999)
(explaining and questioning Jeffersonian notion that ideas are not excludable).
100 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv L
Rev 501, 519 n 70 (1999); Nicholas Khadder, National Basketball Association v Motorola,
Inc, 13 Berkeley Tech L J 3, 3 (1998) ("Recently ... the Internet has enabled users to
distribute and sell information very widely at a negligible marginal cost to the distributor.") (cited in note 13).
101 See, for example, Jacques Steinberg and Edward Wyatt, Boola, Boola: E-Commerce
Comes to the Quad, NY Times section 4 page 1 (Feb 13, 2000) (describing efforts by Columbia, Carnegie-Mellon, Stanford and the University of Chicago, in partnership with
Unext.com, to teach classes over the internet to thousands of students simultaneously).
102 Among other types of information now available at no fee to consumers is the SEC's
entire database of recent securities filings by public companies and flight availability and
airfares for virtually all major airlines. See, for example, <http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.
htm> (website providing publicly-traded companies' SEC filings) (visited July 20, 2000);
<www.expedia.com> (website providing information on price and availability of flights on
most scheduled airlines) (visited July 20, 2000). While this information was publicly
available in the past, its gathering into more convenient forms for consumer comparison
ameliorates the problem of consumers' limited time, effort and mental resources. See, for
example, Herbert A. Simon, From Substantive to ProceduralRationality, in 2 Models of
Bounded Rationality 424, 430 (MIT 1982) (noting that while rational actors are assumed
to be infinitely capable of calculation in order to optimize their behavior, in the real world
we must consider the limits on human mental abilities to gather and process information).
See also Howard Rachlin, John H. Kagel, and Raymond C. Battalio, Substitutability in
Time Allocation, 87 Psychol Rev 355, 359 n 1 (1980) ("Economics is often said to be a science of rational behavior, but 'rationality' means no more to economists than conformity to
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Furthermore, increased ease of gathering data from multiple
sources makes it harder for businesses to withhold information
from consumers. The internet's low transaction costs allow third
parties to aggregate and disseminate consumer experience data
in new ways. °4 As a result, these businesses can produce information access that improves overall efficiency by defeating producer attempts to strategically withhold information about inferior product or service quality. For example, the market for used
cars might generate more transactions if better data about the
historical performance of individual models of cars and even specific individual cars becomes available. °5 The increased accessibility of information reduces producers' individual incentives to
strategically withhold information in order to increase each individual producer's share of the gains from contracting; ironically,
producers may nonetheless wind up better off if the market
10 6
thereby becomes more efficient and more transactions occur.
Courts have dealt with antitrust problems in industries that
produce information or access to information before, particularly

economic theory. Economics is properly a science of maximization rather than rationality."). Agents who effectively make a living as middlemen for this information-such as
full-service brokers and travel agents-are well aware of the opportunity for profit that
exists-or existed-when information is or was difficult for unsophisticated consumers to
digest. See, for example, Scott McCartney, Computer Class:Airlines Find a Bag of HighTech Tricks to Keep Income Aloft, Wall St J Al (Jan 20, 2000) (noting that "[a]irline executives say privately that travel agent commissions are likely to go to zero in the next few
years" due to the alternative sales methods, especially "[ilnternet ticket-selling sites]");
Terri Cullen, Online Investing (A Special Report): Doing Your Homework, Wall St J R14
(June 14, i999) (stating that "individual investors who have learned to capitalize on the
wealth of financial data and investment tools available on the Internet now have a leg up
on ... investors who rely on... traditional, off-line brokerage firms").
103 See Oskar Morgenstern, Thirteen Critical Points in Contemporary Economic Theory: An Interpretation, 10 J Econ Lit 1163, 1175 (1972) (given the conditions of perfect
competition, making an economically efficient, rational decision may be a simple concept;
however, such a decision may require computations of such difficulty that they would be
nearly impossible for a real-world consumer).
104 See, for example, Thomas Weber, Can Your Complaints, Adroitly Repackaged,
Build a Web Business?, Wall St J B1 (Jan 10, 2000) (discussing internet companies that
gather "consumer wrath" and "then collate, cross-reference and sell it as market research").
105 This is the converse of the proposition that the attraction of "lemon" sellers to the
used car market, and the absence of information about which cars are lemons, makes the
market less efficient. For a general discussion, see Akerlof, 84 Q J Econ (cited in note 20).
106 See, for example, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 99-100, 127 (1989); Jason
Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules,
100 Yale L J 615, 625-28 (1990); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L J 729, 735-44 (1992).

238

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2000:

in the context of the media." 7 However, developments concerning
the internet are beginning to spawn unprecedented antitrust actions.' °8 As just one example of the contrast between the two contexts, a prominent issue in antitrust cases involving newspapers
is deciding the extent of the geographic market-that is, what
other competitors exist in a local area." 9 By contrast, one of the
hallmark characteristics of the internet is its worldwide access
and worldwide presence.1 0
The problem with applying established antitrust presumptions to internet cases is that we lack the experience we need in
order to avoid a rule making that prohibits beneficial conduct
whose utility outweighs both savings in judicial resources and the
cost of conduct that should be prosecuted but which is not in the
rule's absence."' For example, the per se rule against output restrictions may involve different interests where the output restricted is information. This uncertainty stems from the inherent
difference between information and the traditional products of
manufacturing industries with which antitrust is more familiar.
Indeed, the crucial role that information plays in markets should
give us pause.' 2 After all, it is far from clear whether or not the
policy that "the costs of monopoly wrongly permitted are small,
13
while the costs of competition wrongly condemned are large"
applies to antitrust investigations of businesses that generate
superior information or greater access to preexisting inferior information. Two examples may illustrate the problem.

107 See, for example, Lorain Journal, Co v United States, 342 US 143, 154 (1951) (concluding that newspapers' boycott of radio advertisers was anticompetititive).
108 See, for example, United States v Microsoft Corp, 87 F Supp 2d 30, 51 (D DC 2000)

(addressing tying claim concerning Windows and Internet Explorer and addressing possibility that "mechanically" applying "separate deMand" test could lead to condemnation of
"'integrations' that represent genuine improvements to software.").
109 For a general discussion, see Community Publishers, Inc v Donrey Corp, 1995-1
Trade Cases (CCH) 1 71,049 (W D Ark) (concluding that newspaper participated in two
markets: one for readers and one for advertisers).
110 See, for example, Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace at 192 (cited in note
99) (asking how behavior "will systematically be governed within multiple, noncoordinating jurisdictions").
"'
See, for example Williamson, 76 Geo L J at 289 (cited in note 31) (framing the issue
in terms of a trade-off between administrative benefit and the risk of possibly punishing
beneficial practices).
112 "Quality information" has been described as "the lifeblood of strong vibrant, markets," at least with respect to capital markets. SEC Wants New Rule on Issuing Info,
Houston Chron at 2 (Dec 16, 1999) (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt).
113 Easterbrook, 63 Tex L Rev at 15 (cited in note 31).
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A. Blocking "Bots" as an Antitrust Problem?
Suppose, for example, that a new internet-based firm, AuctionCo, emerges, whose primary benefit to consumers is to make it
possible for them to receive information about the price and
availability of products which they otherwise would not know are
available. The firm does not actually "own" or "sell" these products itself; it merely serves as a "meeting place" for buyers and
sellers by providing a forum to facilitate information exchange.
AuctionCo does this by contracting with sellers to offer their
products on its web site. Suppose further that the dominant
method by which these sales occur is via an online auction system
under which the firm charges a commission on each sale pursuant to its agreements with the sellers. This commission, together
with revenue derived from selling advertising on its web site,
forms the bulk of the company's income.14 AuctionCo is wildly
successful, and in fact succeeds in garnering nearly 90 percent of
daily web-auction traffic.
Now suppose that another company, BotCo, develops a software robot, or "bot"-in this case, a piece of software that probes
other web sites-to gather information on the prices and products
available on various auction web sites, including that of AuctionCo. BotCo then displays the information gathered from various
auction web sites on its own web site, providing a level of increased convenience to consumers. AuctionCo then develops and
implements software to thwart BotCo's bot. BotCo then brings an
antitrust suit against AuctionCo, alleging that AuctionCo's
agreements with competing sellers and AuctionCo's conduct in
preventing BotCo from competing in the provision of information
to buyers amount to a prohibited conspiracy to inhibit the output
of such information. 115
114

This example will, to anyone familiar with the internet, greatly resemble eBay, Inc.

However, in fairness to that company, it has not traditionally derived a significant portion
of its income from advertising on its web site. See eBay, Inc, Form 10-KAnnual Report, 20
(1999), <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/lO65088/0001012870-99-000878.txt> (visited July 18, 2000) (stating that the company "to date, has chosen to sell almost no advertising on its web site"). Nonetheless, reliance on web site advertising has been a familiar
business plan for many other "e-commerce" firms, including its largest auction on-line
competitor, Yahoo! Inc, which, like eBay, also has non-auction components. See Yahoo!
Inc, Form lO-KAnnual Report 6 (2000), <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/
0000912057-00-014598-dl.html> (visited July 18, 2000) (stating that the company 'derives significant revenues from the sale of advertising" on its Web pages including "hypertext links ...to advertisers' Web sites").
115
This case will, for some, resemble a current controversy involving eBay, Inc.
See eBay, Inc v Bidder's Edge, Inc, 2000 WL 764197 (N D Cal). See also Carl Kaplan,
Judge Bans Web Site's Use of eBay Data, NY Times C7 (May 26, 2000) (reporting judge's
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There is, of course, a per se rule against agreements limiting
output."6 Assuming that AuctionCo's very existence is based on
agreements with sellers (who themselves are in competition), is
AuctionCo's attempt to exclude BotCo's bot illegal per se?
Whether or not the action itself it anticompetitive, it is clear that
any attempt to apply the traditional per se rule at this point is
potentially misguided. Several questions loom, including the
questions of what output is being restricted, and whether this is
appropriately considered single-firm (AuctionCo) or multi-firm
(including individual sellers) behavior.117 Certainly, the output of
"web sites" may be restricted if BotCo cannot gather the information it desires. The output of "information" may be reduced in the
sense that consumers will not be able to compare different auction web sites' prices in one place. Of course, defining output in
such terms makes about as much sense as defining the output of
an airline to be time spent sitting on an airplane as opposed to
relatively rapid transportation."8 But if enough consumers substitute BotCo's web site for AuctionCo's web site, this diversion of
traffic could threaten AuctionCo's advertising revenues, and
thereby its profitability. If AuctionCo folds as a result, there will
be an overall reduction in information and information access.
Further complicating all of this is that, if AuctionCo constitutes
the product of numerous agreements with competing sellers, it is
hard to see what interest AuctionCo would have in blocking price
comparisons. In particular, sellers would not have an interest in
blocking price comparisons because "bargains"-or relatively
decision to grant eBay's request "to stop another Web site.., from compiling a database of
eBay's auction information without its consent"); John Wilke, eBay's Efforts to Block 'Bots'
Draw Scrutiny, Wall St J A3 (Feb 4, 2000) (noting that Justice Department Antitrust
Division "is looking into auctioneer eBay Inc's efforts to limit software probes of its Web
site by other online companies, a dispute that could help define rules of engagement for
Internet commerce"); Edward Harris, eBay Competitor Files Antitrust Lawsuit, Wall St J
Eur 6 (Feb 9, 2000) (describing private "antitrust lawsuit against eBay Inc" based on theory that "eBay's moves to block auction search sites ... reduce competition in the marketplace"). However, the example sketched out above does not include an analogue to the
eBay allegation that the "bots" in that case slowed down or damaged eBay's computer
systems. Wilke, eBay's Efforts to Block 'Bots' Draw Scrutiny, Wall St J at A3.
116 See Addamax Corp v Open Software Foundation,Inc, 152 F3d 48, 51 (1st Cir 1998).
117 Given the rather wide definition of "joint venture" that exists under antitrust law
today, see, for example, Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 5.2 at 197-98 (cited in note
49), AuctionCo could well be so defined as an example of multifirm activity.
118 Certainly, it often seems like airlines produce the former rather than the latter.
But, in antitrust terms, airlines are generally seen as producers in a market for transportation. See, for example, Complaint in United States v AMR Corp, American Airlines, Inc,
and AMR Eagle Holding Corp, No 99-1180
13 (D Kan) (filed May 13, 1999),
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/2438.htm> (visited Feb 13, 2000) (describing relevant market as air transportation between pairs of cities).
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"cheap" (or in classical economic terms, inefficiently low) prices
for buyers-are only possible if an auction is inefficient in the
sense that the buyer who would bid the most is unaware that the
product is being auctioned, or the buyer is otherwise unable to
participate." 9
The point of this is not to argue that AuctionCo has engaged
in perfectly legal conduct. Rather the point is that the case itself
can only be handled, with our contemporary understanding of
this business model, by a full rule-of-reason inquiry.
B. Cutting Out Those Who Would Cut Out the Middleman?
AuctionCo's attempts to stay profitable by preventing others
from appropriating the information it gathers may excite sympathy. But consider another example. Suppose an organization of
realtors and local realty boards, seeing the growth of the internet
in other sales areas, decides that it too would like to become an
online vendor, providing information about homes for sale on a
web site and selling advertising to companies that would like to
market to prospective homebuyers. 2 ° Its members, individual
realtors and local realty boards, have contracts with homeowners
to represent them in selling their homes.'' Accordingly, the organization creates a web site and displays information on the
various homes that its members have for sale. In order to induce
its member realtors and local realty boards to provide information to display on the website, the organization offers shares in
the venture to the local realty boards. Recognizing that the web
site will have more value to prospective home buyers the more
home listings it has, and will have more value for home sellers
given the more buyers it can expose to available homes, the organization seeks and obtains exclusive contracts with the local
119 See Robert Ming, Delaware's Duty to Auction After Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 22 Pepp L Rev 1541, 1597 n 246 (1995). This example could be
even further complicated if it turned out that less information on sales and prices would
be available if auction sites became "splintered" such that buyers were less able to compare prices, thereby making auctions less efficient. Consequently, sellers might receive
lower prices as auctions became less efficient. Thus, utility to sellers of an allencompassing auction could be a predicate to generating information about items for sale
in the first place.
120 This example will seem familiar to those who have followed the dispute over the
practices of Homestore.com's web site venture realtor.com, which is partly owned by the
National Association of Realtors. See John Wilke and Tristan Mabry, Virtual Realty:
Homestore.com Uses its Lock on Listings to Widen Realtor Net, Wall St J Al (Aug 6, 1999)
(discussing charges that "the real-estate industry is acting 'to co-opt the Internet to protect its high-margin structure'") (quoting Peter Sealey).
121 Realtors traditionally receive a commission based on a percentage of the sale price.
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realty boards. Under these exclusive contracts, the organization
lists the homes that its agents have contracts to sell in order to
start the market "tipping" towards its site.122
These exclusive contracts also have the effect of preventing
other competing sites from being able to offer information about
homes for sale in many markets. Because they contain fewer
properties due to the exclusive contracts, the sites omit valuable
information about the market, and so become disadvantaged relative to the organization's web site. Accordingly, these competing
sites bring an antitrust suit against the organization.
Our concern should be focused on competition between alternative sources of valuable information. Accordingly, this example
appears more troubling than the AuctionCo example, at least in
part because of the concern that the realtors, who are participants in a pre-existing market, may be acting in concert to forestall internet-based competition. By contrast, AuctionCo appears
more likely to have generated new information about products,
thereby creating a market that did not previously exist. Although
the two examples involve different acts-using software code to
prevent a potential competitor's access to a web site's information
versus using exclusive contracts to prevent gathering of the same
information for a possible competitor-they have similar effects
in thwarting alternative providers of information. As in the AuctionCo example, the actual sellers (sellers of homes in this example, perhaps sellers of tchotchkes in the AuctionCo example) may
have conflicting interests: on the one hand, they may want a single, comprehensive web site that makes it more likely that the
highest-value buyer sees their home or product for sale, but on
the other hand, they might desire a competitive market to lower
the commissions that their intermediary is charging them.
The point of this example, like the previous example, is that
the per se rule on output restrictions that developed in the context of manufacturing industries may generate relatively more
false positives, that is, wrongly condemned practices, in the context of businesses that produce information or access to information. Certain types of exclusive practices in these industries may
counsel wariness. 23 But we are far from the point at which we
122

The web site would thus seek to create network-effect-driven efficiencies for sellers

by developing a single, focused site for buyers, thus seeking to ensure that the highestvaluing buyer knows about the particular house for sale, similar to the efforts of the auction site in the previous example.
123 See Shapiro, 7 Geo Mason L Rev at 679 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that the magnitude of potential harm to competition from exclusive contracts with individual custom-
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can comfortably apply the types of presumptions that gird per se
rules or structured rules of reason.
The foregoing two examples do not demonstrate that per se
rules or other antitrust presumptions can have no application
with respect to the internet or in the context of industries where
information is the product. If the second example were altered so
that the realtors involved were not in fact setting up a web-based
venture to convey listing information, but were instead simply
agreeing not to supply any information to any internet-related
entity, the case might fit more squarely into the type of conduct
to which the application of a per se rule is not problematic: the
naked restriction of output. The point is not that per se rules do
not make sense, but that the internet and information-producing
industries may require a re-balancing of the costs and benefits
behind per se rules.
CONCLUSION

If courts exercise greater caution in extending experiencebased per se rules to new types of restraints and to the internet
and information-producing industries, it may come at the expense
of the predictability that is assumed to result from per se rules
and structured rules of reason. However, the benefit of certainty
as a result of fixed presumptions must be weighed against the
cost of mistakes.'2 4 This calculus is different due to certain characteristics of these industries that have been the focus of much
recent attention, such as increasing returns to scale-the idea, for
example, that e-mail as a form of communication becomes increasingly more valuable as the number of users increases. Other
nonstandard characteristics include near-zero marginal costs of
production, as with some software, and the concept that in these
industries businesses need to set standards, even with competing
entities, in order for the products of both businesses to be successers "tends to be greater in network markets" because of the enhanced ability in such markets for exclusive contracts to create a serious problem for an entrant that needs to develop economies of scale to compete, and that this general problem identified by Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley may be worse in network industries). See also Eric Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 81 Am Econ Rev 1137,
1137 (1991) (suggesting that an incumbent monopolist may be able to prevent entry by
signing exclusive contracts with individual consumers in exchange for a small discount for
signing the exclusive contract rather than a non-exclusive one).
124 Compare Lessig, Code and Other Laws at 222 (cited in note 99) (pointing out that
courts' hesitance in resolving constitutional questions in cyberspace are "grounded in
prudence," and within "th[e] ideal of prudence in general... [w]e should isolate the source
of the [judicial] difficulty").
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ful. The risk that over-enforcement may disrupt a virtuous cycle
is a real one. There is a downside to the phenomenon of increasing returns to scale: disruption of a web site, software program or
other similar product due to regulation or litigation can lead
some users to stop using the product. The fact that some users
flee the product would by itself lead other users to cease using the
product due to the reduced utility of doing so, and so on in a
"death spiral."1 15 Courts can create a real hazard by prematurely

imposing the presumptions of per se rules or structured rules of
reason developed in the very different context of more conventional, mature industries.

125 Indeed, in the ongoing Napster case, the district court has acknowledged that "even
a narrow injunction may so fully eviscerate Napster, Inc. as to destroy its user base"although the court decided this risk did not trump the rights of an infringed copyright
holder. A&M Records v Napster, 2000 WL 1182467, *26 (N D Cal), injunction stayed.

